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Abstract 
Is cultural studies on the verge of an ethical tum? What role could the work of Richard 
Rorty play in such an ethical tum? Rorty may be considered as a cultural theorist 
whose work enables a productive articulation of cultural studies and that area of 
experience known as "ethics" - one's sensitivity and sense ofresponsibility to others in 
pain. Through an extended "misreading" of the dispersed texts Rorty has written on 
and around the topic, it is possible to formulate a Rortian account of ethics as solidarity, 
including such concepts as the moral subject, the other, moral identification, moral 
community, as well as the ethical implications of Rorty's theoretical ethnocentrism. 
This account, by virtue of its antifoundationalist and discursive theoretical position, 
holds much interest for a cultural studies concerned to understand the normative 
dimension of discursive meaning. 
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Introduction 
I. Cultural Studies and Ethics 
If there is one thing that people working within cultural studies agree on, it is 
that there is no universally agreed definition of cultural studies. In almost all accounts 
cultural studies appears as an amorphous array of ideas, practices, methodologies, 
theories, techniques, texts, institutions, values, politics and motives, rather than as a 
conventionally defined academic discipline. As Tony Bennett writes, cultural studies 
"comprises less a specific theoretical or political tradition or discipline than a 
gravitational field in which a number of intellectual traditions have found a provisional 
rendez-vous": it is "an area of debate in which, certain things being taken for granted, 
the dialogue can be more focussed" (319, n.1 ). 1 
This unruly amorphousness granted, I think most practitioners in the field would 
agree that, whatever else it is, cultural studies is political. Two things can be meant by 
this. First, the object of inquiry in cultural studies - culture - is construed politically, as 
inseparable from relations of power, rather than, say, morally or economically or 
aesthetically or spiritually. While this does not mean all analyses performed under the 
name of cultural studies will focus only or mainly on the political dimension of cultural 
discourses, it does mean all such cultural discourses are agreed to be political. Second, 
not only is the object of inquiry political, so are the motives behind the inquiry. Simon 
During notes, for instance, that from the beginning cultural studies has been "an 
engaged form of analysis'', one which "did not flinch from the fact that societies are 
structured unequally, that individuals are not all born with the same access to education, 
money, health-care, etc" (1-2). This is not to say that cultural studies possesses a single 
normative political programme, but it is just to say that its practitioners openly admit 
that what they are doing is inseparable from power relations. They are deliberate about 
their nonchalance for putative academic "objectivity" and about their attempts to 
employ cultural studies in the service of their political aims.2 
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However, notwithstanding this highly developed political consciousness, 
cultural studies has not had much to say about ethics. Ethics and politics can be 
thought of as two distinct, yet compatible, ways of describing intersubjective relations. 
Foucault ' s model ofrelations of power could be seen to characterize politics, while 
Levinas' s model ofrelations of responsibility could bee seen to characterize ethics. Put 
simply, politics asks, "What relations of power will best implement my 
responsibilities?", whereas ethics revolves around the question "For whoITJ dm I 
responsible?" Conceptually, considerations of responsibility are prior to considerations 
of power, although historically, it can often be the other way around. With ethics and 
politics thus configured, cultural studies can fairly be said not to have theorized the 
production of moral responsibilities. It has, indeed, been noticeably silent about 
ethics. 3 
Of course, ethical feelings are not absent. The ethical residue of responsibility is 
undoubtedly latent in the consciously political agendas of feminist , Marxist, 
postcolonialist and queer critics and theorists working within the field: their political 
aims conceptually presuppose a sense of moral responsibility to women, the working 
class, non-Europeans and gays. Otherwise, why work politically for these groups in the 
first place?4 Moreover, as a contentious and contested non-discipline, cultural studies 
has for a long time been characterized by a genuine, if fractured , sense of professional 
solidarity. 
These two points having been granted, however, solidarity has not been the 
object of explicit theoretical attention. This neglect is understandable. Cultural studies 
was, after all, partly constituted through the construction of theoretical vocabularies 
whose historicism and nominalism suspended all consideration of normality and 
rendered the non-discipline radically at odds with conventional moral theory and 
philosophy. The form of cultural studies emerging within English departments, 
especially, was often incidentally cut off from any talk of ethics by the way it 
deliberately positioned itself against pre-superstructuralist, liberal humanist kinds of 
literary criticism with their Leavisian proclivity to see literature as a moral force that 
can somehow "make you a better person" (Eagleton 1983, 207). Given that cultural 
studies's theoretical positioning eschewed such notions as philosophically naive, its 
neglect of ethics makes historical sense. 
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Things may be about to change, however - may already be beginning to change. 
For ethics is increasingly being distinguished from politics and addressed by theorists 
employing an antifoundationalist theoretical vocabulary similar to the one so vital to 
cultural studies, theorists working either within the non-discipline or at its edges in a 
range of contiguous disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. The work of 
Emmanuel Levinas ( 1969; 1981; 1989; 1996), for instance, is gaining a lot of attention. 
His unconventional understanding of "the ethical" as a fundamental openness to the 
Other as a "radical alterity" is currently being developed by theorists as diverse and 
prominent as Simon Critchley ( 1992; 1996; 1999), Christopher Norris ( 1994 ), Zygmunt 
Bauman (1989; 1993 ), Jacques Derrida (1978; 1991; 1999), Jean-Frarn;:ois Lyotard 
(1989), John Llewelyn (1995; 1998) and Luce Irigaray (1991). The work of social 
theorist Jlirgen Habermas is also apposite. Whereas Levinas construes ethics to be an 
animal-like, corporal, pre-linguistic affair, Habermas's "discourse ethics" (1990; 1992; 
1993) locates it in what he deems to be the universal social processes of language. 
Literary critics such as J. Hillis Miller (1987; 1995) and Tobin Siebers (1988), too, are 
incorporating antifoundationalist ethics into their work, as are several American moral, 
social and political philosophers (May 1995; Caputo 1993; Sandel 1982; Baier 1991 ). 
Also, the work of feminist and postcolonialist theorists from a range of disciplines, 
from literature to political science, has increasingly begun to address the idea of ethics 
in a variety of ways consistent with theory (Spivak 1996; Chow 1993; Chow 1995 ; 
Dean 1996; Fraser 1986; Fraser 1990; Shildrick 1997; Benhabib 1992). The moral and 
political concerns underlying Michel Foucault's extensive work have recently been 
emphasized by the posthumous publication of Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth ( 1997) and 
by Christopher Falzon's study of the ethical dimension of Foucault's work (1998). In 
addition, the publication of two anthologies of essays (Merrill 1988; Squires 1993) 
considering the possibility and nature of ethics in the age of postmodernism draws 
contributions from a wide range of figures, such as Kate Soper, Paul Hirst and Chantal 
Mouffe. Finally, the neo-pragmatist thinker Richard Rorty, whose work is the object of 
this study, has addressed ethics in terms consistent with the antifoundationalism of 
cultural studies. Although most people tend to associate Rorty with the themes of 
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pragmatic antifoundationalism, liberal aestheticism and reformist politics, his work on 
ethics, usually discussed under the term "solidarity", can in fact be traced as far back as 
1979 to a few comments in Part Two of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (182-92). 
Since then a barrage of texts have produced a powerfully suggestive, if diffuse, picture 
of the nature of ethics as solidarity as well as a dedicated commitment to the particular 
form of ethics found in his version of "liberalism".5 
Not all of these theorists would think of themselves as making contributions to 
cultural studies, let alone working within cultural studies. I do not believe we can 
validly claim that their work makes up a well-established, self-conscious debate about 
solidarity in cultural studies. My claim is that the emerging work of these solidarity 
theorists, by virtue of its antifoundationalist theoretical positioning, marks the 
opportunity of a rapprochement between that cultural studies and that area of 
experience and inquiry designated by the term "ethics". Cultural studies has the chance 
to incorporate ethics into its vocahulary hoth as an object of theory or analysis and as an 
issue of normative debate. The work of the above ethical theorists can be taken as the 
first sign that ethics is now in the process of attaining this status. The broad aim of my 
study is to facilitate this process, with particular regard to the way of theorizing ethics 
as solidarity that is found in the texts of Richard Rorty. 
II. Richard Rorty and Ethics as Solidarity 
As befits someone who praises the virtues of conversation, Rorty must be one of 
the most discussed academic figures of the late twentieth century. This lavish 
treatment, however, has not been bestowed on his work on solidarity. Out of 27 
contributions to collections of essays on his work, only three (Burrows; Fraser 1990; 
Guignon and Hiley) could be said to address solidarity, and even then to a limited 
degree. The only book to attempt an examination ofRorty's complete oeuvre, David L. 
Hall's Richard Rorty: Poet and Prophet of the New Pragmatism ( 1994 ), though it 
purports to "wander here and there in Rorty 's rather broadly conceived corpus" (7), 
hardly touches on ethics. What has been written on Rorty's solidarity work could 
accurately be described as wide but shallow. It is wide because from the beginning it 
has been multi-disciplinary, with contributions coming from philosophers, literary-
cultural critics, anthropologists, political scientists, jurists, theologians and historians. 
It is also wide because anyone who writes on any aspect of Rorty 's work usually ends 
up including some comments somewhere on his notion of solidarity. This is especially 
true in discussions which take Rorty's "politics" as their ostensible subject; although 
some writers may never mention the words "solidarity" or "ethics", talking instead of 
Rorty's "political" position, their chief concern can be ethics. 
Unfortunately, the considerable multi-disciplinary breadth of the discussion 
about Rorty 's solidarity work is not currently matched by any comparable analytical 
depth. While there is a surfeit of work which offers superficial observations, there is a 
dearth of commentary that actually engages with Rorty's work through patient and 
detailed readings of his texts. Only three recent discussions ofRorty's solidarity work 
mount sustained book-length analyses: Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind: 
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The Ungroundable Liberalism of Richard Rorty (1995) by Norman Geras, Professor of 
Government at the University of Manchester; Solidarity and the Stranger: Themes in 
the Social Philosophy of Richard Rorty (1997) by Christian theologian Ronald 
Alexander Kuipers; and The Work of Friendship: Rorty, His Critics, and the Project of 
Solidarity (1999) by philosopher Dianne Rothleder. 6 
I would like to make five comments on the overall shape of the discussion of 
Rorty's solidarity work in order to contextualize my own contribution. First, there is 
little productive cross-pollination of ideas between the different commentators, with the 
majority showing a limited awareness of the other work on Rorty's ethics. Second, 
most of the commentary is critical insofar as it seeks only to point out alleged mistakes 
and dangers of Rorty 's views rather than doing this and suggesting constructive 
developments or revisions. Third, many critics, even the most sophisticated ones such 
as Geras, Kuipers, Lentricchia, and Bernstein, are often mistaken in their understanding 
of important elements of in Rorty's ethical position. Geertz's essay (1986), for 
instance, contributed to the widespread myth that Rorty's work is necessarily 
ethnocentric in a pernicious way, while Fraser's celebrated essay (1990), perhaps the 
single most influential piece of commentary on Rorty's ethico-political work, has 
directed the attention of many commentators towards the putative tension between 
Rorty 's pragmatism and romanticism. 
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Third, it is significant that Rorty's work on aestheticism and politics is often 
thrown into the analytical pot in discussions of his work on solidarity. In some cases 
(Bhaskar) preoccupation with criticizing Rorty's aestheticism or social democratic 
politics precludes serious engagement with what he has written on solidarity. In other 
cases (Fraser, Kuipers, Rothleder), aestheticism and politics are used as a means of 
undermining the theoretical validity of his account of solidarity. This seems to evince 
the mistaken assumption that if you accept what Rorty says about solidarity you must 
also accept what he says about aestheticism and politics. I would argue that some form 
of anti foundational ism, such as that outlined in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, is 
indeed a vital part of Rorty's work on ethics. However, this is not the case when it 
comes to his work on aestheticism, nor that on politics. In relation to his ethics, Rorty 's 
politics and aestheticism are optional extras : we are not bound to consider his ethics 
with either his unique solution for the cohabitation of the public (ethical) and the 
private (aesthetic) spheres, the guiding issue of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
( 1989), nor his praise of social democracy as the best form of political organisation, a 
major concern of Achieving our Country ( 1998). 7 Therefore, my study of Rortian 
ethics retains his antifoundationalism, but treats his views on politics and aesthetics as 
irrelevant to the present analysis . 
Fifth, if the concerns of the discussion about Rorty 's solidarity work can be 
divided into two broad strands - the theoretical, which focuses on "logical" problems 
with Rorty 's account of solidarity (inconsistencies, incoherencies, tensions, 
contradictions, paradoxes, oversimplifications, exaggerations and inappropriate 
emphases), and the normative, which addresses the putative destructive effects of 
Rorty's account on the particular form of solidarity the given commentator supports 
(such as socialism, egalitarianism, liberalism, feminism) - then the vast majority of 
critical attention (with the exception of Geras' s first two chapters) is concentrated in the 
normative strand, rather than the theoretical strand. Critics have been more concerned 
to highlight the supposedly useless or even dangerous effects of Rorty's work on this or 
that particular sense of solidarity than they have to consider its possible strengths as a 
theoretical account of solidarity in general, regardless of any supposed effects. This 
seems to me to be wrong-headed: how can we judge the normative effects of something 
before taking the time to understand it fully on a theoretical level? Partly as a 
corrective to this tendency, my study deals almost exclusively with the theoretical 
aspect of Rorty's solidarity work. 8 
Ill. Argument and Methodology 
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It should be clear by now that this is not a philosophical study of Rorty 's work 
on solidarity. Although I hope his philosophical critics may be forced to think again 
through my treatment of his work, such a hope is incidental to my primary aims. Rorty 
is very much at the centre of my study in terms of explicit content - although even then, 
he is cast as a cultural theorist - but he is at the margins in terms of conscious 
objectives. My intention is not to contribute to the philosophical debate about Rorty by 
defending him from his detractors, but to examine the potential I see in his work to add 
a significant new perspective to cultural studies. My thesis is (1) that Rorty's scattered 
texts can be read as a theoretical account of solidarity, and (2) that this account, viewed 
as a contribution to cultural theory, opens up productive possibilities for cultural 
studies. Thus, my title places "Rorty" between "Ethics" and "Cultural Studies" and 
hyphenates all three terms in order to suggest that Rorty is a conductor or link between 
the two. 
Most of the thesis is concerned with examining Rorty 's dispersed texts on 
solidarity in an attempt to systematize them into a theoretical account of the topic, one 
which can provide temporary answers to the following questions: What is solidarity? 
How can it be produced? How can it be prevented? How can it be modified? - all in 
terms consistent with an antifoundationalist theoretical vocabulary. Then in a final 
chapter I examine the terms of a possible rapprochement between ethics and cultural 
studies which the Rortian account of solidarity allows. My claim here is that the 
Rortian account can be viewed as making a contribution to cultural theory, one which 
may open up various productive possibilities for cultural studies, such as cleaving open 
the logical space needed to allow various forms of analysis of ethics within a cultural 
studies perspective. Through this articulation of Rortian solidarity with cultural 
studies, the Rortian account takes on a different shape, a suggestive potentiality which 
can in turn re-shape cultural studies, imbue it with a new potentiality vis-a-vis ethics. 
It is crucial to realise that neither a systematic account of solidarity nor the 
utility of such an account to cultural studies are to be simply "found" in Rorty's work. 
Rorty's strategy in approaching the topic (or indeed any topic) has been to avoid any 
attempt to be systematic in favour of multiple assays, descriptions, re-descriptions, re-
re-descriptions, not in the hope that he will eventually get things right, but in the hope 
that describing solidarity in different ways may persuade as many different people as 
possible. Such an approach yields creative and inconsistent results on the levels of 
signifiers and signifieds. He has, moreover, never offered his work on ethics as a 
contribution to cultural theory and would, I suspect, be aghast at the suggestion that 
what he has written could be of use for cultural studies. What Rorty writes of Donald 
Davidson applies equally as well to himself: "Since [his] work has been almost entirely 
in the form of essays, and since he eschews large programmatic statements, it falls to 
his admirers to attempt a synoptic view of his work" (NRP 113). Rorty ' s lack of 
interest in both explanatory (as opposed to persuasive) systematicity and cultural 
studies means my task has precisely been to "make" from out of his texts not only a 
systematic Rortian account of solidarity, but also an argument as to its utility for 
cultural studies. 
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In order to achieve this I have adopted as an interpretative methodology creative 
misreadings of his texts. The concept of misreading is associated with the work of 
Harold Bloom on poetic originality, and Rorty himself, following Bloom, argues that 
originality often proceeds by recontextualizing previous descriptions, rearranging them 
in new ways, placing them in untried relations to other descriptions. If this 
experimental strategy usefully highlights previously hidden features , similarities, 
differences, syntheses, antitheses, analogies and sequences, it can be said to have 
creatively misread the old descriptions and produced something original. Despite the 
fact my interpretive approach is more inferential than imaginative, this fairly describes 
my strategy in approaching Rorty's texts. 
Importantly, I am acutely aware that, thanks to "the ethics of reading", as Miller 
puts it, my misreading of Rorty's work represents just one possibility, and that therefore 
the misreading could be different, with other emphases, other ellipses, other sequences. 
I do not pretend to have woven his texts together into a seamless account, but recognise 
the cutting and suturing I have necessarily employed. Nevertheless, I do not think my 
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use of his work for a purpose he did not intend is unfair to him. Rorty himself would 
agree. In response to Frank Farrell's charge that he makes significant exegetical errors 
concerning the work of Donald Davidson, Rorty has written, "If you borrow 
somebody's good idea and use it for a different purpose, is it really necessary to clear 
this novel use with the originator of the idea? . .. My account can, I should like to 
think, stand on its own feet, and be judged on its own" (RF 190). While I make no 
pretensions that what follows is a systematic and detailed treatment of ethics, I am 
aiming for a systematized account of Rorty's treatment of ethics. All the while I seek to 
remain both consistent with his theoretical premises and faithful to the implicit spirit of 
his work. So, even though the following account of solidarity cannot be said to be 
Rorty 's, it can, I hope, be said to be Rortian. 
My methodology of misreading proceeds in two moves: a long internal one and 
then a short external one. The internal misreading will involve culling words and 
extracts from throughout Rorty' s corpus and pasting them together in new 
combinations, juxtaposing textual fragments to construct untried configurations, 
weaving together texts written years apart to create a temporarily homogeneous text. It 
is " internal" in the sense that it stays largely inside Rorty's texts. In order to 
foreground my methodology, I refer to Rorty 's texts individually through abbreviations 
(CLC, FMR, WA W, etc), rather than referring monolithically to his collections of 
essays (see the list of Abbreviations). Through this process I aim to accentuate certain 
of his ideas about solidarity while downplaying other, less successful, ideas. The 
intended result is a more systematic theoretical account of solidarity than is currently 
provided by Rorty's own work. 
The external misreading will involve recontextualizing the Rortian account of 
solidarity by interpolating it within cultural studies. This will engender an ability to 
view Rortian ethics as a cultural theoretical model. It is "external" in the sense that I 
move outside Rorty's texts in order to consider their relation to the texts that make up 
cultural studies. Thus I complete the misreading of Rorty's texts by suggesting their 
utility for the analysis of solidarity as discourse. While I claim no definitive 
conclusions, I do suggest the fruitful benefits for cultural studies of the Rortian way of 
looking at ethics. 
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In outline: Chapter One looks at Rorty's Freudian picture of "the moral subject" 
as a mechanical web of self-description. Chapter Two elaborates what Rorty has 
written on "the other" to whose pain the moral subject is sensitive and towards whom 
he or she feels responsible. Chapter Three explores "moral identification" as the 
mechanism by which solidarity, as embodied in a "moral community", is produced. 
Chapter Four describes the broader "ethnocentric" conditions of solidarity, thus 
rounding off my misreading of the Rortian account of ethics as solidarity. Chapter Five 
concludes my thesis by turning to the implications of the account for cultural studies. 
Notes 
1 Simon During, for example, asserts that "cultural studies is not an academic 
discipline quite like others" (During 1 ), while Jonathan Culler asks wistfu lly " What is a 
professor of cultural studies supposed to know?" ( in Nelson 273). The multiplicity of 
cultural studies has not stopped many from offering definitions. Of course, these 
definitions have usually been offered as manifesto-like attempts to achieve concrete 
political effects on the behaviour of others, rather than an attempt to capture cultural 
studies' s essence. See Easthope, Eagleton ( 1983 ), Nelson, Johnson , Inglis and Bennett 
for interesting examples. 
2 For comments and qualifications on the political nature of cultural studies, see 
Bennett (307), Eagleton (1983, 210), Johnson (79), Nelson (278), Frow and Morris 
(354), Thwaites et al. (155-71) and Baldwin (17). 
3 I want to distance my empirical observation from Keith Tester's normative and 
evaluative view that cultural studies is a "morally cretinous" discipline (3) in which 
"meaningful questions about cultural and moral value have been at best ignored and at 
worst pushed quite beyond the asking" (6). 
4 Tobin Siebers's (1988) claim that all forms of literary criticism and theory are 
premised on an ethics, however latent, would not only overlap with the literary end of 
cultural studies, but could probably be argued in direct regards of cultural studies. As 
James W. Carey writes, "cultural studies consists of a thinly disguised moral and 
political vocabulary" (67). 
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5 Rorty's most significant work on ethics can be found in the following texts 
(ordered by date of original publication): the essays "Method, Social Science, and 
Social Hope" (1980), "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism" (1983), "Freud and Moral 
Reflection", "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity" and "The Priority of 
Democracy to Philosophy" (all 1984), "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation: A 
Reply to Jean-Franvois Lyotard", "On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz" and 
"Solidarity or Objectivity" (all 1985), "Science as Solidarity" and "Thugs and 
Theorists: A Reply to Richard Bernstein" (both 1987), "Moral Identity and Private 
Autonomy: The Case of Foucault" and "Unger, Castoriadis, and the Romance of a 
National Future" (both 1988); much of the book Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
( 1989), particularly the chapters "The Contingency of Selfhood", "The Contingency of 
a Liberal Community'', "Private Irony and Liberal Hope" and "Solidarity"; the essays 
"Feminism and Pragmatism'', "Rationality and Cultural Difference" and "The End of 
Leninism, Havel, and Social Hope" (all 1991); the autobiographical essay "Trotsky and 
the Wild Orchids" (1992); "Feminism, Ideology, and Deconstruction: A Pragmatist 
View" and "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality" (both 1993); and "Who 
Are We? Moral Universalism and Economic Triage" (1996). 
6 The following is a selection of commentary on Rortian ethics. For an example 
of a critic who points out the alleged exegetical mistakes in Rorty's work see Farrell 
(117-47). The smug and light-minded tone of Rorty 's writings is criticised by Williams 
(175), Stout (45, 54), and Critchley (1996, 24). Commentary on the 
antifoundationalism crucial to Rorty 's solidarity work is voiced, in progressive order of 
criticism, by Daly (175-89), Laclau (62), Baker (115), Veroli (121), Lentricchia (16-9), 
Haliburton (50-1 ), Critchley ( 1996, 25-6), Goodheart (231-5), Stout (256), Hollis (249), 
Guignon and Hiley (357), Bernstein (283) and Mounce (209, 228). Commentary on 
Rorty's use of the public/private distinction is expressed by Hall (134-6), Herdt (84-
91), Laclau (64-5), Fraser (1990, 303-16), Williams (170-5), McCarthy (366-7), 
Guignon and Hiley (358), Critchley (1996, 24-5), Haber (59-70), Bernstein (280), 
Haliburton (5 lff.), Goodheart (225-9) and Bhaskar (134-5). Rorty's ethnocentrism is 
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addressed by Bernstein (247), Dean (7), Veroli (123), Norton (27-45) and Geertz (109-
13). Rorty's anti essentialist model of the moral subject is the target of work by Farrell 
(117-47), Critchley (1996, 26), Geras (47-69), Bernstein (275-7), Hollis (244-56), and 
Guigon and Hiley (356). Rorty's claims as to the efficiency of the mass media in 
facilitating solidarity is incisively discussed by Tester (90-109). 
7 Rorty's moral position (liberalism) should be carefully separated from his 
political position. The latter is outlined most clearly in TT, although the essay is now 
over a decade old. See also the more recent EL where Rorty urges leftists to stop using 
"capitalism" and "socialism" as the central terms of political analysis and to focus 
instead on "the struggle against human misery" (EL 229) . I believe that Rorty may be 
serving a useful purpose in his insistence that a politico-economic theory derived from 
the nineteenth century should not be employed uncritically. However, to repeat, my 
study ofRorty's ethics stands independently of his politics. 
8 I am of the view that all that need be said of any putative normative 
implications is that there are none. Rorty ' s theoretical redescription of how ethics 
works is consistent with all normative ethical visions and all political programmes. 
This has been explained lucidly by Rorty himself: JOMS 6, DMACL 132, S 189. 
